In the s, the organisation campaigning against apartheid were very few. Political activists of the PSU Parti socialiste unifiémigrant support organisation Cimadelocal solidarity groups set up by Christian activists particularly from CCFD and documentation centres on Third World issues — which would later give birth to the Ritimo network and Peuples solidaires — did what they can to raise awareness among French public opinion.
And they felt quite isolated. The Communist party gave us only lip support. There was no feeling of bad conscience whatsoever, and even less guilt, among French companies. There was, however, one boycott campaign which is still remembered today, targeted at the Outspan-branded oranges imported from South Africa. Although France, alongside the US and the UK, was not in favour of economic sanctions, it had not formally opposed the resolution approved one year earlier, inby the UN Security Council, which recommended an arms embargo.
This resolution was not binding. While in the UK the Labour party, having just won the general elections, did impose an arms embargo, the French were happy to fill the gap.
Between and48 Mirage F1 were exported to South Africa, as well as helicopters Alouette, Frelon, Pumalight armored vehicles and missiles. On 16 Junethousands of students from the township of Soweto Johannesburg demonstrated against school segregation.
The protest was brutally suppressed.
Nouveau regime amaigrissant africain
At least were left dead. A year later, the UN finally approved a binding embargo. Who cares! Only the navy programme remains incomplete: and it is precisely in this area that the embargo on arms sales remains unapplied ," said a newspaper of the National Party, then in power.
The racist regime held another 15 years. In addition, the increase in foreign investment has resulted not in changing the system but in making it stronger ," argued Ruth First in History proved her right. Between the life sentence given to Nelson Mandela and his election as the first President of a democratic South Africa, three decades would pass. The Soviet Union was doing everything it could to get hold of South Africa, a strategic country with Cape Town controlling a major shipping route.
So far, France has chosen not lv perdre du poids naturellement confront this dark past, which is not so remote. Tous les communiqués. Sauf mention contraire, le contenu de ce site est sous contrat Creative Commons.
In France, the anti-apartheid movement remains politically isolated In English-speaking countries, transnational corporations active in South Africa, such as Shell and Coca-Cola, were the target of major boycott campaigns.
France, a leading supplier of weapons for the racist South African state is also the year when France became the leading supplier of arms of the South African apartheid regime. A French amnesia " Far from being an obstacle to economic growth in South Africa, racial capitalism - apartheid - is the cause of the extraordinary growth rate of its economy. The emphasis was on the market rather than the state, towards privatising state assets, pleasing investors by reducing vitamine d mincir rapidement strength of trade unions and reconfiguring the educational system to prepare young people for skills needed in the labour market Marais It outlined liberalising reforms to the South African economy and abandoned state and regulatory protection by opening up the South African economy to global markets, hoping that in the long term the economy would become globally competitive in selected niche sectors.
It reduced or dropped tariffs protecting South African goods and allowed easier movement of goods and currency into and out of South Africa. To reduce inflation, the GEAR framework seemingly encouraged or rather did not discourage the Reserve Bank to keep interest rates high, thereby lowering higher consumer demand, price increases, and making the economy attractive to foreign investment and those who have savings Lundahl The wide-reaching, almost surprising, changes announced by the GEAR policy produced outcomes that are ambiguously inconclusive.
The economy has grown, but not substantially enough to reduce the high unemployment or make a substantial dent to the backlogs inherited from apartheid. The result is the creation of a two-tier service system in health, education and social security: one private one public. The private service sector provides relatively high quality products and services for those who can afford them; the public sector serves those without the choice and who remain dependent on the less-resourced state sector.
Consequently, the racial and class inequalities of the past remain. More worrying is that the policy, its emphasis on the market as the valued distributor of goods and services, has left the historically privileged classes, the majority of whites and a rising black middle class, as the main beneficiaries. These societal divisions have played themselves out in the higher education sector, despite ambiguous efforts contained in government policy on higher education to address past apartheid legacies.
This objective can be traced to the extensive report of the National Commission on Higher Education NCHE setting out proposals to reform the higher education sector. The NCHE report was published in The NCHE was established with the broad mandate to advise the Minister of Education on restructuring higher education to contribute towards reconstruction and development in The goals of higher education were considered to complement each other even though they could prove to be contradictory.
This engagement should be reflected in course content, pedagogy, and programmes. Institutional autonomy is to be exercised within the limits of accountability. Moja and Hayward recognise its contribution as having initiated a discussion on higher education by providing a common starting point, establishing an admirable example of transparency, consultation and democratic participation.
Despite the ideologically varied composition of the commission, the final report tilted towards the progressive approach by demanding greater access for poor, black students to universities and technikons without seriously undermining the narrow conservative conception, reducing higher education to the role of responding to the needs and demands of the economy.
Instead of the two statutory bodies the Higher Education Forum and Higher Education Councilthe Green Paper proposed a single body called the Council on Higher Education CHE to regulate and produce expert knowledge about higher education, to advise the Minister of Education on all policy matters and to take responsibility for quality assurance of the sector.
In July the Education White Paper 3 was released. Building on the language developed in the Green Paper, it acknowledges the several goals of higher education enunciated in the NCHE report.
It mentions the following:. It expects higher education to provide the training, skills, innovations, and knowledge so that the South African economy can integrate and interact with the dominant global economy on a competitive footing.
Yet the meanings of these terms were open to conflicting interpretations and at times practical implementation that remained contested at the level of higher education institutions themselves. Lastly a new formula to distribute public funds to higher education institutions, defined as a goaldirected funding system which linked public funds to institutions demonstrating movement towards the goals set out in the White Paper and National Plan, was adopted to enable the state to steer the changes required by the Act.
This was not always the case. In this instance, in curriculum debates concerning the undergraduate programme at the University of Cape Town, African academic Mahmood Mamdani argued for asserting African Studies more centrally into the Humanities programme, with a course that problematised the key themes in discourses about and on Africa. While this marked an interesting and perhaps exciting point in the transformation debate at UCT, Mamdani left the university in the face of strong white conservative criticism and the issues raised were quickly marginalised and not allowed to threaten the dominant Eurocentric institutional culture as the university settled into its old established patterns.
The main challenge the democratic state faced was that the number of students entering or historically excluded from higher education, the fields of study, degrees, throughput rates, staff composition, research outputs and funding were all strongly correlated to race and gender factors.
Ten years into democratic South Africa, the majority of black African, Coloured and Indianworking class and poor students lag significantly behind white and black middle class groups in entering universities, emerging with a degree qualification if they manage to obtain financial aid, and challenging the elitist content of institutional culture. It asserted that with state funding amounting to 0.
In South Africa university enrolments exceed those in the other tertiary education sectors. Despite increases in student numbers and other costs incurred by the sector as a whole, state funding has not increased where in it amounted to 0. The funding has actually declined for higher education as a percentage of tertiary education and has generally hovered between 0.
Induring the height of apartheid, UCT had 3 African students; in there were 4, and in5, in comparison the enrolments for white students are 7, in8, in and 10, in At Stellenbosch University, African students in numbered 3, compared to 15, white students. At the UWC, African student numbers increased dramatically in the s to 6, inthen declined in to 4, students, and increased slightly again in to 5, The former Afrikaans language universities and distance education providers attracted the highest number of black students but overall the number of students qualifying for university admission has steadily decreased.
In provinces with larger numbers of poorer and rural schools the decline in matriculation exemption rates have been more pronounced. Equally worrying is the concern that many who qualify for university are unable to make the grade.
Consequently, despite government and university management pressures to increase throughput rates, too many students take longer to complete their degrees or drop out. At the latter, the institutional weaknesses, poorly prepared students and resource constraints account for the greater burdens faced by the historically black universities.
Consequently, the historically white universities, given their range of past advantages, remain better resource-endowed, grant many more postgraduate degrees and produce more of the research output, although these are dismally low by international standards. The macro-economic policy embraced by the democratic government has enormous implications for the role of higher education insociety.
Students are encouraged to take degrees in the natural sciences and commerce, rather than the arts and the humanities. Critics of the GEAR policy challenge these themes. Two assumptions guide thinking and discussion within this viewpoint.
Consequently, and this is the second point, universities should change and reconfigure themselves to produce the type of graduates the economy requires and help make the South African economy more competitive in this new globalization era. This is not necessarily the case. Aculture and history of racism remains pervasive in South African society and this directly affects labour market employment practices. Two contradictory trends were registered in the South African labour market.
Between and highly skilled, graduate students were in demand; the lower the level of qualification and skills the less the demand. The botoxer larousse illustré in the total number of jobs was Those with only primary school education and below showed negative growth rates - the economy had no jobs for them. After these trends changed. More astonishing is that employment for black students with degrees actually declined by Employment for Coloured students with degrees increased only slightly by 3.
The South African economy is highly differentiated. Any role that higher education will play in producing graduates for the labour market will have to work with a much more differentiated notion of the South African economy and the racially influenced hiring practices of the labour market.
There are many links between universities and the polity in post South Africa — formal and informal, direct and indirect. Higher education institutions have in the post period produced significant numbers of graduates who took up positions in the public sector.
Some universities, such as the University of the Western Cape, lost many of its senior academic staff to the public sector. Without this input the success of the transition, the bases for democratic consolidation and the quality of governance would have been less secure. The role of higher education institutions in policy-making and evaluation has also increased dramatically sincewith many academics supplementing their university incomes by contentiously doing consultancy work for the state.
Botox kzn south coast 4wd education institutions provide a social and cultural space for both academic and political elites to meet and establish relationships.
In a country like South Africa with its new political system and a legacy of deep division the importance of a forum for communication, bringing people from diverse backgrounds together, is vitally important for the consolidation of its democratic dispensation.
At the same time the relationship between universities and the state is not an easy one. An inevitable tension exists between the expectations of the state and the role universities see themselves playing in relation to the political system.
Graduates from both black and white universities have taken jobs in the state, private sector and civil society. They have moved into former white neighbourhoods, their children in the main attending former white schools, and are participating in civil society structures formerly reserved for whites.
In this middle class sense, some public spaces in South Africa have become deracialised and universities, in the creation of the emerging black elite, can be held indirectly responsible for this social impact.
The growth of the South African economy from the decade-long period of recession and political turmoil of the s can be attributed in large measure to having the people to take up high level skilled employment.
Indirectly, the increase in the purchasing power of the new black middle class has directly helped the economy grow. The quality of life of the new middle class empowers this class. Given the degree of a civic socially responsible ideology encouraged by the state and embraced by this class, it is positioned to put resources, skills, time and ideas back into the impoverished communities from which many have come.
More explicitly, at the political level transition theorists have long established that without a significant middle class, societies undergoing democratic transition are less likely to consolidate their democratic institutions Diamond, Linz et al.
Linz argues that a test for democratic consolidation is that when given a serious crisis, key elites will choose to abandon the democratic institutions of their society. This seems less likely in the South African case, demonstrating the importance, legitimacy and value that both the middle and working classes bestow upon the hard won democratic institutions of the society. Universities, which were once directly active participants in the racist, apartheid project, have contributed to a new democratic culture.
Many of these new democratic practices can be traced to the student resistance of the s, more firmly located within the historically black universities, but also influencing practices in the historically white universities, as students and academics moved from the former to the latter institutions. The many forums, seminars and lectures by prominent speakers, most identifying closely with a democratic ethos, help to spread such values and consolidate them beyond university settings.
This is not to deny that undemocratic values still pervade the society, but the democratic trend appears to be dominant. The corporate media, which have adopted a critical stance towards the new government, has nevertheless also experienced internal changes. Many of the new journalists received their education at South African higher education institutions and are products of the s student revolts.
In their new role in a powerful site of ideological production, they contribute towards spreading information, democratic values and critical analyses, thereby enhancing South African democracy. Those among the poor and the working class daily bear the brunt of such abuse. Many from these groups find it difficult to get into higher education institutions because they are unable to afford the fees.
The students from poor and working class backgrounds in the s did enter universities in significant numbers. However, soon the historically black universities complained that they had to increase fees and monitor fee payment more systematically than previously because they did not receive any additional funding from the state. The fees struggle also brought to the attention of students other issues, such as the continued poor quality of student resources at the historically black universities in comparison to the historically white universities, failure to change the curriculum sufficiently to move beyond Eurocentric paradigms, the demand for alternative forums of democratic governance at these institutions and a host of other alternative ideas constituting post-apartheid institutions.
Many student activists once firmly located within the anti-apartheid struggle, many fighting within the fold of the ANC, now face the ANC as government.
They and other progressive social forces are in the process of deciphering new ways of expressing their differences towards government policies and practices. The transition in social activism has been cautious given that the ANC is still fighting entrenched racist practices and is often itself a player in contemporary resistance discourses in South Africa. In the main, it can be argued that it mostly reflects the values and goals repeatedly conveyed during the freedom struggle: to overcome the legacies of racism and exploitation.
Yet the content of these are variously debated. Due to the nature of the transition and conservative macro-economic policies and elite ideology, higher education institutions, located as they are in the sphere of civil society, were in a relatively strong position in relation to the state.
These institutions assumed the role of either reproducing inherited social relations or changing them. They tend to reproduce inherited social relations and change them more slowly than the state and the majority of South Africans who participated in the struggle against apartheid wished.